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COMMENTS
THE MEANING OF LIFE (OR LIMB): AN ORIGINALIST
PROPOSAL FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY REFORM
"In expounding the Constitution of the United States, every
word must have its due force, and appropriate meaning ....
Every word appears to have been weighed with the utmost delib-
eration, and its force and effect to have been fully understood."
-Chief Justice Roger Taney1
"Life may have no meaning or, even worse, it may have a mean-
ing of which I disapprove."
-Ashleigh Brilliant2
I. INTRODUCTION
In August of 2005, Michael Lane walked into a Salt Lake City
police station to unburden himself of a secret he had been harbor-
ing for fifteen years.3 Lane described to police how he had been
high on methamphetamine one Sunday morning in 1991 and had
repeatedly thrown his girlfriend's baby to the floor in an attempt
to make the two-year-old stop crying.4 The confession was re-
corded on video and Lane conceded to police that he "was pre-
pared to go to jail .. .and face his consequences."5 Fifteen years
earlier, however, he had been acquitted of murdering the child.6
1. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570-71 (1840).
2. ASHLEIGH BRILLIANT, POTSHOT No. 1347, (Brilliant Enterprises 1977) (postcard).
3. Pat Reavy, Acquitted Man Says He's Guilty, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Salt Lake




UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
His attorney had successfully raised a reasonable doubt of Lane's
guilt by arguing that the injuries to little P.J. Watts could have
occurred anytime within a seventy-two-hour span.7
Although Lane may not have been aware of it when he con-
fessed, he was in no danger of facing jail time for the murder; the
Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, which states that no
person "for the same offence [may] be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb,"' precluded the possibility of new murder charges. The
confession was subsequently forwarded to the Salt Lake City Dis-
trict Attorney's Office and the United States Attorney's Office,
but the most severe consequence facing Lane for the murder was
the possibility of civil litigation.9
The right to be free from multiple prosecutions for the same of-
fense has been a feature of common law, to varying degrees, for
almost 800 years.'° The prohibition of double jeopardy is largely
meant to prevent overzealous governmental authorities from re-
trying a person multiple times for the same offense until a convic-
tion is secured.11 But in situations like that of Michael Lane-
where evidence later surfaces that a guilty person was acquit-
ted-the prohibition appears to be more of an anachronism. In an
age where the media and state bar disciplinary procedures serve
as checks on prosecutorial misconduct,12 and where concerns
about the accuracy of criminal trials are limiting the scope of cer-
7. Paula Zahn Now: Outside the Law (CNN television broadcast Jan. 17, 2006)
(transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0601/17/pzn.01.html).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9. See Reavy, supra note 3. Lane's confession potentially could have subjected him to
criminal liability for perjuring himself at the 1991 trial. However, there were insufficient
records from the trial for such a charge. Id.
10. See DAVID S. RUDSTEIN, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 4 (2004).
11. See id. at 39.
12. An excellent example of this proposition is found in the so-called "Duke Lacrosse
Rape Case." See Duff Wilson & David Barstow, Prosecutor Asks to Exit Duke Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2007, at Al. The racially charged case involved several Duke University
lacrosse players who had been accused of raping a woman at a party. The prosecutor, Mi-
chael Nifong, allegedly "pursued a weak case for political gain." Id. Amid heavy media
criticism of his handling of the case, Nifong requested to be dismissed from the case. At
the time of this writing, he is facing disciplinary action from the state bar for alleged ethi-
cal violations, including misleading the public about the evidence and withholding excul-
patory DNA evidence from the players' defense attorneys. Id. The overwhelming negative
media attention has even prompted some North Carolina state lawmakers to consider re-
forming the oversight laws for prosecutors. See id.
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tain criminal rights,13 perhaps it is time to reevaluate the double
jeopardy prohibition.
Other common law nations around the world have already be-
gun to address the problems created by double jeopardy laws.' 4
On September 11, 2006, William Dunlop became the first person
in England convicted under a recent change to that country's dou-
ble jeopardy law of a murder for which he had been previously
acquitted. 5 England's efforts to modernize its double jeopardy
law are an example of how this ancient principle can be brought
in line with evolving criminal justice norms that emphasize the
justness of the outcome over the procedure. Unlike the English
13. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2006) (holding that the exclu-
sionary rule does not apply to knock-and-announce violations).
The exclusionary rule generates "substantial social costs," which sometimes
include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large. We have therefore
been "cautio[us] against expanding" it, and "have repeatedly emphasized that
the rule's 'costly toll' upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives pre-
sents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application." We have rejected
"[i]ndiscriminate application" of the rule, and have held it to be applicable
only "where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,"-
that is, "where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 'substantial social costs.'"
Id. at 2163 (citations omitted).
14. Part II.B of this comment details recent updates to English double jeopardy law.
Australia is also taking a serious look at its double jeopardy laws in the aftermath of the
High Court's 2002 decision in The Queen v. Carroll, (2002) 213 C.L.R. 635 (Austl.). Ray-
mond Carroll had been convicted by a jury of murdering Deidre Kennedy in 1985 but the
conviction was quashed on appeal. Evidence later surfaced indicating that he had commit-
ted the crime. Carroll was convicted of perjury in 2000 for denying under oath at his 1985
murder trial that he had killed Kennedy. On appeal to the High Court, the perjury convic-
tion was overturned. The High Court determined that the perjury prosecution called into
question Carroll's acquittal and therefore was barred by the common law principle of dou-
ble jeopardy. Id. at 637-38. Since the case was decided, the Australian state of New South
Wales has passed statutory exceptions to the double jeopardy rule and the Council of Aus-
tralian Governments has begun discussing the possibility of national reforms to the double
jeopardy laws. Press Release, Senator Chris Ellison, Australian Minister for Justice and
Customs, Moves to Increase Uniformity of Criminal Laws (Nov. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/j usticeministerhome.nsf/Page/Media-Releases-2006_4th
_Quarter_10_November_2006_-_Moves to -IncreaseUniformityofCriminal_Laws. New
Zealand's Law Commission has likewise recommended revising that country's double jeop-
ardy laws to allow unjust acquittals to be reopened. See LAW COMMISSION, ACQUITTAL
FOLLOWING PERVERSION OF THE COURSE OF JUSTICE, 2001 at 14-15, available at http://
www.lawcom.govt.nzfUploadFiles/Publications/Publication 77 166 R70.pdf. A bill that
incorporates the Law Commission's findings has been introduced in New Zealand's Par-
liament. See LAW & ORDER COMMITTEE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE BILL, COMMENTARY, 2004
[158-2], (N.Z.), available at http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/6A6607CC-B5CD-4D1
A-BCB6-41805E572239/52582/DBHOHBILL_6192_259999995.pdf.
15. Press Release, The Crown Prosecution Service, William Dunlop Pleads Guilty in
First Double Jeopardy Case (Sept. 11, 2006), available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/
pressreleases/archive/2006/152 06.html; see also Jon Silverman, The Law of "Double
Jeopardy," BBC NEWS, Sept. 11, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/5333230.stm.
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system, however, any changes to double jeopardy practices in the
United States must be consistent with the Fifth Amendment.
The purpose of this comment is to argue that, in certain cir-
cumstances, allowing reprosecution of acquitted defendants is
both desirable and feasible within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause.16 The concept of double
jeopardy and the phrase "life or limb" evolved along disparate
paths in the common law. The concept and the phrase were unre-
lated until the drafters of the Fifth Amendment purposefully
united the two in the Double Jeopardy Clause. Section II of this
comment traces the evolution of English double jeopardy law,
culminating in recent reforms which may provide the framework
for improving American double jeopardy standards. Section III
discusses the adoption of the double jeopardy principle into the
Fifth Amendment through the curious choice of wording: "jeop-
ardy of life or limb." A historical reexamination of the meaning of
"life or limb," as it was understood by the drafters of the Fifth
Amendment, suggests that the Framers intended to limit the pro-
tection of the Double Jeopardy Clause to capital cases. Viewed in
this light, the Double Jeopardy Clause should be no barrier to
double jeopardy reforms patterned on the English example.
II. SETTING THE STAGE: EVOLUTION OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY LAW IN ENGLAND
Double jeopardy clauses, in various forms, have existed in
codes of laws for millennia. Most early double jeopardy rules were
primarily concerned with preventing multiple punishments for
the same offense. The Talmud, for instance, prescribed no more
than one punishment for one crime; a person convicted of a capi-
tal crime could be flogged or put to death, but not both.17 Early
double jeopardy rules also addressed the finality of acquittals.
The Code of Hammurabi prescribed that a judge who altered a fi-
nal sentence was required to pay a penalty and was removed from
16. For the contrary view, that we should not attempt to emulate the English double
jeopardy standards, see Daniel H. Erskine, Double Jeopardy in the UK: We Should Not
Follow Suit, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 2, 2006, at 22.
17. See RUDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 2; see also GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE SPIRIT OF
JEWISH LAW 172, 207-10 (1953) (noting that capital punishment precluded all other civil
or criminal penalties, and that only one crime, defamation of a man's wife, was punishable
by both lashes and fines).
[Vol. 41:991
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the bench."1 History records an incident from the nascent Roman
Empire in which Emperor Tiberius found that he lacked the au-
thority to disturb a jury's not guilty verdict with which he dis-
agreed.' 9 Following the demise of the Roman Empire, the double
jeopardy principle survived in the canon law of the Catholic
Church.2° The canon law double jeopardy principle, relying on the
biblical verse, "There shall not rise up a double affliction," was
predicated on the belief that God punishes a person only once for
each misdeed.2'
The earliest identifiable advocate of a double jeopardy prohibi-
tion in England was Thomas Becket, an Archbishop of Canter-
bury in the twelfth century.22 Becket railed against a provision in
King Henry II's Constitutions of Clarendon which provided for
simultaneous punishment of church officials in the ecclesiastical
and royal courts.23 The provision stated:
Clergyman charged and accused of anything shall, on being sum-
moned by a justice of the [K]ing, come into his court, to be responsi-
ble there for whatever it may seem to the [Kling's court they should
there be responsible for; and [to be responsible] in the ecclesiastical
court [for what] it may seem they should there be responsible for-so
that the [K]ing's justice shall send into the court of holy church to
see on what ground matters are there to be treated. And if the cler-
gyman is convicted, or [if he] confesses, the church should no longer
protect him. 24
18. THE OLDEST CODE OF LAWS IN THE WORLD: THE CODE OF LAWS PROMULGATED BY
HAMMURABI, KING OF BABYLON 2 (C. H. W. Johns trans., 1903).
§ 5. If a judge has judged a judgement, decided a decision, granted a sealed
sentence, and afterwards has altered his judgement, that judge, for the al-
teration of the judgement that he judged, one shall put him to account, and
he shall pay twelvefold the penalty which was in the said judgement, and in
the assembly one shall expel him from his judgement seat, and he shall not
return, and with the judges at a judgement he shall not take his seat.
Id.
19. See RUDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 2-3.
20. JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL
POLICY 3 (1969).
21. Id. (quoting Nahum 1:9 (Douay)).
22. Note, Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereigns, 35 IND. L.J. 444, 445 (1959-60).
23. Id. at 445-46.
24. CONSTITUTIONS OF CLARENDON cl. 3, reprinted in RUDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 5.
20071
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In response to the uproar accompanying the murder of Becket,
Henry II acquiesced and ended the practice of subjecting church
officials to double jeopardy in the ecclesiastical and royal courts.25
Some scholars speculate that the modern English conception of
double jeopardy may have been derived from Becket's feud with
Henry IH.26 Other theories contend that the concept was imported
from the Roman or continental canon law, or developed inde-
pendently from Anglo-Saxon criminal procedure.27 Given Western
Europe's "common fund of shared judicial concepts,"2" it is likely
that all three factors contributed to the English conception of
double jeopardy.
Although its origins are difficult to pinpoint, by the thirteenth
century the principle that a person should not be tried or pun-
ished twice for the same offense had gained a foothold in English
common law.29 The prohibition on double jeopardy evolved
through case law into four technical pleas: autrefois acquit (al-
ready acquitted); autrefois convict (already convicted); autrefois
attaint (already sentenced to civil death); and pardon.3" A suc-
cessful plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict-the most
common of the four pleas-prevented a common law court from
retrying or imposing punishment upon the criminal defendant. "
The double jeopardy pleas were primarily understood as simple
procedural devices-as opposed to substantive rights-through-
out the Middle Ages in England.32 By the eighteenth century
Enlightenment thinking prevailed and English legal scholars be-
gan to speak of double jeopardy prohibitions as rational and fun-
damental concepts.33 An express prohibition on double jeopardy,
25. See Note, supra note 22, at 446.
26. See SIGLER, supra note 20, at 3.
27. RUDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 4, 6.
28. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 3.
29. See RUDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 4.
30. Charles L. Cantrell, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Punishment: An Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 735, 754 (1983). Sources spell "autrefois" in various
ways. I use only one spelling for consistency.
31. See Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169 (1873).
32. See Cantrell, supra note 30, at 756.
33. Sir William Hawkins, writing in the early eighteenth century, described the plea
of autrefois acquit thusly:
But if a man steal goods in one county, and then carry them into another, in
which case it is certain that he may be indicted and found guilty in either, it
seems very reasonable, that an acquittal in one county for such stealing may
[Vol. 41:991
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however, was nowhere to be found in British statutory law.34 To
the contrary, homicide prosecutions were excepted from autrefois
pleas by statute in 1487, although the statute was rarely applied
and eventually repealed.35 Double jeopardy continued to evolve in
Britain primarily as a creature of common law jurisprudence un-
til well into the twentieth century, when a remarkable criminal
case caused the British to reassess the venerable concept.
A. Impetus for Rethinking Double Jeopardy in England: Britain's
Rodney King
It took an incident of police and prosecutorial ineptitude-
drawing comparisons to the Los Angeles Police Department's
handling of the Rodney King affair 36-and the ensuing public out-
cry to prompt the British to reevaluate their double jeopardy
laws. One evening in the spring of 1993, Stephen Lawrence was
waiting for a bus at a southeast London bus stop with a friend,
Duwayne Brooks. 7 Lawrence, a black eighteen-year-old aspiring
architect, was attacked by a gang of white youths wielding weap-
ons and shouting racial epithets.3" Lawrence managed to run two-
hundred yards from the scene before succumbing to fatal stab
wounds.39 Brooks, who would later serve as the chief eyewitness
for the prosecution of Lawrence's attackers, escaped unharmed.4 °
be pleaded in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same stealing in an-
other county ... and therefore if he could not bar the second prosecution by
the acquittal on the first, his life would be twice in danger from that which is
in truth but one and the same offence, and only considered as a new one by a
mere fiction or construction of law, which shall hardly take place against a
maxim in favour of life.
SIR WILLIAM HAWKINS, 2 TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 517-18 (1824).
34. See SIGLER, supra note 20, at 4.
35. RUDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 8-9.
36. See, e.g., A Fight for Justice: The Stephen Lawrence Story, BBC NEWS, Feb. 22,
1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special-report/1999/02/99/stephen-lawrence/281742.stm
[hereinafter Fight].
37. Id.; Alan Travis, "Race Murder" Charges Dropped, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, July 30,
1993, http://www.guardian.co.uk/lawrence/Story/0,,941254,00.html.




40. See, e.g., id.
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A nearby police officer, who was on the scene within minutes,
immediately began the investigation into the crime.41 Within
hours of the murder, the Metropolitan Police had received nu-
merous tips from the community regarding the identity of the
perpetrators, and five suspects were identified.42 The subsequent
police investigation, which a later inquiry found to be hampered
by corruption and racism, failed to uncover significant evidence
against the suspects.43
Three of the suspects ultimately went to trial.44 However, the
prosecution's case against the suspects fell apart when the trial
judge excluded Brooks's eyewitness testimony as "contaminated
and flawed."4" The exclusion of Brooks's testimony, coupled with
the inadequate police investigation, left the prosecution with lit-
tle evidence to present.4 6 As a result, the judge ordered the jury to
return not guilty verdicts for all three suspects."
The public perceived the acquittals as a miscarriage of justice,
with blame falling on the perceived incompetence of the police
and prosecutors.48 Voicing the public outrage, London's Daily
Mail newspaper famously printed the pictures of the five suspects
on the front page under the headline, "MURDERERS," and chal-
lenged the suspects to sue the paper for libel if the accusation was
wrong.49 The BBC labeled the situation the "most serious threat
41. Fight, supra note 36. Brooks alleged that the officers mistreated him when they
arrived, asking him if he had a criminal record and threatening to handcuff him. See What
Happened?, supra note 38.
42. Fight, supra note 36.
43. Id.
44. See In the Spotlight, BBC NEWS, Feb. 19, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_
report/1999/02/99/stephenjlawrence/281866.stm.
45. What Happened?, supra note 38. Although Brooks identified the suspects in a
lineup, an officer testified that Brooks had admitted that he had not seen the faces of the
suspects. and that he had learned of their identities prior to the lineup. Id.
46. See SIR WILLIAM MACPHERSON, THE STEPHEN LAWRENCE INQUIRY, 1999, Cm.
4262-I, § 39.55, available at http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm42/
4262/4262.htm ("Mr. Brooks was the only witness who could give direct evidence in the
Stephen Lawrence murder."); id. § 39.38 ("[Tlhere was no satisfactory evidence to corrobo-
rate the doubtful evidence of Mr. Brooks ....
47. Id.
48. Fight, supra note 36. Even the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Paul Con-
don, called the investigation "our failure." Id.
49. Murderers: The Mail Accuses These Men of Killing. If We Are Wrong, Let Them Sue
Us, DAILY MAIL (London), Feb. 14, 1997, at 1; see also Michael Seamark & Stephen
Wright, Stephen Lawrence Murder Inquiry Won't Be Reopened, DAILY MAIL, July 26, 2006,
available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in-articleid=3
97819&in pageid=1770 (recounting the decision to print the "MURDERERS" headline
[Vol. 41:991
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to a cohesive urban society since the mass inner-city rioting of
1981. "5 Exacerbating the situation in the eyes of the public, two
internal police investigations into the affair concluded that there
had been no wrongdoing on the part of the police.51
The uproar prompted Home Secretary Jack Straw to appoint
Sir William Macpherson to conduct an exhaustive inquiry into
the Lawrence murder investigation.52 Macpherson's findings, ti-
tled The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, but more commonly known
as the Macpherson Report, 3 were highly critical of London's Met-
ropolitan Police, which the report characterized as suffering from
"institutional racism."54 The Macpherson Report made seventy
recommendations to the government.55 With a few minor stipula-
tions, Secretary Straw accepted or took into further consideration
all seventy recommendations.5"
Recommendation 38 of the Macpherson Report created a means
by which the acquittals of the three suspects could be reopened by
creating an exception to the autrefois acquit plea. Titled "Prosecu-
tion After Acquittal," Recommendation 38 stated, "That consid-
eration should be given to the Court of Appeal being given power
to permit prosecution after acquittal where fresh and viable evi-
dence is presented."57 Secretary Straw pledged to forward the rec-
ommendation to the Law Commission and set a deadline for a re-
port on the feasibility of the recommendation.-
8
and the controversy it caused).
50. Fight, supra note 36.
51. Race: The Macpherson Report, BBC NEWS, May 7, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
vote2001/hi/english/main-issues/sections/facts/newsid-l190000/1190971.stm.
52. See Fight, supra note 36.
53. MACPHERSON, supra note 46.
54. Id. § 46.1. The Macpherson Report defined institutional racism as "[t]he collective
failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people be-
cause of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin." Id. § 6.34. For a summary of the findings of
the Macpherson Report, see Met's "Incompetence" in Lawrence Investigation, BBC NEWS,
Mar. 24, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/285569.stm.
55. MACPHERSON, supra note 46, ch. 47.
56. See JACK STRAW, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, STEPHEN
LAWRENCE INQUIRY: THE HOME SECRETARY'S ACTION PLAN (1999), available at
http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-and-publications/publication/community-policingsl
pages.pdfview=Binary.
57. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
58. Id.
20071
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The Law Commission, a statutory body charged with evaluat-
ing legal reforms,59 came out in support of the proposal to relax
the double jeopardy prohibition.6" The Commission recommended
that in cases involving murder, genocide, or reckless killing, the
"rule against double jeopardy should be subject to an exception
... where new evidence is discovered after an acquittal."61 It also
recommended that the changes apply retroactively to acquittals
that had already occurred to avoid the "prospect of public outrage
where new evidence came to light and the exception would other-
wise have been available."62 The Commission advocated a two-
part threshold for determining whether new evidence warranted
a second trial: the evidence must make the prosecution's case
"substantially stronger," and the likelihood of conviction must be
either "highly probable" or "sure."63 The evidence must also ap-
pear to be reliable.64 In March of 2001, the Law Commission's
proposals were presented to the Parliament of the United King-
dom for consideration.65
B. Rewriting Double Jeopardy Law: The Criminal Justice Act of
2003
The Criminal Justice Act of 2003 ("Act")66 received Royal As-
sent on November 20, 2003.67 Acting upon the Law Commission's
report on Recommendation 38, the Parliament of the United
Kingdom passed the most sweeping statutory change to double
jeopardy law in 800 years, representing a more far-reaching de-
parture from the common law than even the Law Commission
had advocated.68 The Act was Parliament's attempt to correct the
imbalance between two competing notions: "no one should be
59. Law Commission Home Page, http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/ (last visited Apr. 10,
2007).
60. LAW COMMISSION, DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND PROSECUTION APPEALS, 2001, Cm.
5048, at 127, available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc267(1).pdf.
61. Id. at 45.
62. Id. at 46.
63. Id. at 49.
64. Id. at 52.
65. Id. at i.
66. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44 (Eng. & Wales).
67. HOME OFFICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2003: EXPLANATORY NOTES, 2003, at 159,
available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/en2003/ukpgaen_20030044_en.pdf.
68. See generally id. at 10 ("This is in line with, but drawn more widely than, recom-
mendations of the Law Commission.").
1000 [Vol. 41:991
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tried a second time after being acquitted," and the "basic objective
of the criminal law that the guilty should be convicted."69 The law
permits acquittals within England and Wales to be quashed and
previously acquitted defendants to be retried. It likewise pro-
vides a procedure whereby a defendant acquitted of an offense in
a foreign jurisdiction may be retried for the same offense within
the United Kingdom,7' a practice banned since 1677.72 It is, how-
ever, narrowly tailored to achieve the ends of justice while pre-
venting harassing or frivolous retrials. 73 Additionally, several
layers of procedural and substantive safeguards are incorporated
in the Act to prevent abuses.
The heart of the new double jeopardy law is the "new and com-
pelling evidence" standard. 74 Crown prosecutors may have a sec-
ond bite at the apple only if new and compelling evidence comes
to light that casts doubt on the validity of the acquittal verdict. 5
The standard embodies the belief that "where it is manifest to the
public and to the victim, that there is strong evidence now, that
was not available once before, that someone is, in fact, guilty who
has been acquitted,... [it] is an affront to the notion of truth and
justice."76 The new evidence standard is primarily targeted at
blood and tissue samples from decades-old trials that resulted in
acquittals before DNA testing was available.77 Other examples of
new and compelling evidence include the testimony of witnesses
69. HOME AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE, THIRD REPORT, 1999-2000, H.C. 190, 1,
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cml99900/cmselect/cmhaffJ190/190
03.htm.
70. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 75(1)(a) (Eng. & Wales). The Act applies to
Northern Ireland to the extent that it is modified by § 96. See id. § 96. The changes to
double jeopardy law do not apply to Scotland, which retains the common law rule. See
Double Jeopardy Man Admits Guilt, BBC NEWS, Sept. 11, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/uknews/eng land/5144722.stm. This comment will focus on the changes in England and
Wales.
71. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 75(4) (Eng. & Wales).
72. See RUDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 10.
73. See HOME OFFICE, supra note 67, at 10.
74. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 78 (Eng. & Wales); see also HOME OFFICE,
supra note 67, at 51.
75. Prosecutors may only attempt to quash an acquittal one time. Multiple attempts
to retry an acquitted person are not allowed under the law. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c.
44, § 76(5) (Eng. & Wales).
76. HOME AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 69, 18.
77. See HOME OFFICE, supra note 67, at 10; LAW COMMISSION, supra note 60, at 2;
HOME AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 69, 3.
2007] 1001
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who were unknown at the time of trial and confessions of previ-
ously acquitted defendants. 7 8
The first prong of the standard is that the evidence must be
"new." New evidence is defined tersely as evidence "not adduced
in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted."79
Strangely, neither the text of the Act nor the Explanatory notes
makes it clear that the evidence must have been unavailable or
unknown at the time of the first trial; it need only have not been
adduced. 0 This appears at odds with the Law Commission's dis-
cussion of new evidence which framed the issue in terms of evi-
dence discovered post-acquittal. 81 However, the reason the evi-
dence was not adduced at the first trial factors into the Court of
Appeal's decision regarding whether a new trial is granted.82 So
presumably, a prosecutor could not purposefully withhold evi-
dence from trial in order to preserve her ability to retry the case
should the defendant be acquitted.
"Compelling" evidence is the second prong of the evidentiary
standard.8 3 For new evidence to be compelling it must initially be
both "reliable" and "substantial."84 The evidence must then be
found "highly probative" of an "outstanding issue[]" from the
trial.85 The Act defines outstanding issues as "the issues in dis-
pute in the proceedings in which the person was acquitted."86
Thus, the court must weigh the new evidence in the context of an
issue of contention at trial. For instance, if the acquitted created
a reasonable doubt as to the identity of the perpetrator of the
crime, then reliable and substantial evidence going to the issue of
identity would be compelling.87 Evidence going to a collateral
matter or evidence that merely tends to strengthen the case
78. HOME OFFICE, supra note 67, at 10; HOME AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE, supra
note 69 3.
79. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 78(2) (Eng. & Wales).
80. See id.; HOME OFFICE, supra note 67, at 51. Blacks Law Dictionary defines "ad-
duce" as: "To offer or put forward for consideration (something) as evidence or authority."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 42 (8th ed. 2004).
81. See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 60, at 50-51.
82. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 79(2)(c) (Eng. & Wales).
83. Id. § 78(3).
84. Id. § 78(3)(a)-(b).
85. Id. § 78(3)(c).
86. Id. § 78(4).
87. See HOME OFFICE, supra note 67, at 51.
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against the acquitted would not satisfy the new and compelling
standard. 8
The Act's scope is restricted to twenty-nine qualifying of-
fenses."9 Qualifying offenses fall into six categories: offenses
against the person; sexual offenses; drugs offenses; criminal dam-
age offenses; war crimes and terrorism; and conspiracy to commit
one of the qualifying offenses.9" The offenses, each carrying a
maximum sentence of life in prison,91 are limited to those that
"have a particularly serious impact either on the victim or on so-
ciety more generally."
92
In order to quash an acquittal for a qualifying offense, a num-
ber of procedural hurdles must be overcome. A prosecutor wishing
to reopen an acquittal must first obtain the written permission of
the Director of Public Prosecutions ("DPP").93 The DPP may then
grant permission to proceed only if he is satisfied that the new
and compelling evidence standard is met, that it is in the public
interest to quash the acquittal, and that the rights of the defen-
dant under British and European law would not be violated.94
Once approved by the DPP, the prosecutor may then apply to the
Court of Appeal for an order to quash the acquittal.95
The Court of Appeal must make two determinations before is-
suing the order. It must first be independently satisfied that the
new and compelling evidence standard is met.9" The court must
88. See id.
89. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 75, sched. 5 (Eng. & Wales). Part 1 lists the
qualifying offenses for England and Wales.
90. Id. For example, listed offenses include murder, rape, arson endangering life, pro-
ducing class A drugs, war crimes, and hostage-taking.
91. The United Kingdom eliminated the last vestiges of capital punishment in 1998 by
abolishing the death penalty for treason and piracy. Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, c. 37, §
36 (Eng. & Wales).
92. HOME OFFICE, supra note 67, at 50. By contrast, the Law Commission recom-
mended that only three offenses be subject to the new double jeopardy law. LAW COM-
MISSION, supra note 60, at 45.
93. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 76(3) (Eng. & Wales). The Director of Public
Prosecution is the head of the Crown Prosecution Service and reports directly to the At-
torney General. Crown Prosecution Service, Director of Public Prosecutions, http://www.
cps.gov.uk/about/ dpp.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
94. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 76(4) (Eng. & Wales).
95. See id. § 76(l)(a). The Court of Appeal is the second highest court in England and
Wales, inferior only to the House of Lords. See Her Majesty's Courts Service, The Court
Structure of Her Majesty's Courts Service, http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/aboutus/
structure/index.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
96. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 77 (Eng. & Wales).
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then decide that retrying the defendant "in all ... circumstances"
would be in the "interests of justice."97 The Act presents four non-
exclusive factors for the court to consider: the likelihood a retrial
would be unfair; the length of time that has elapsed since acquit-
tal; whether the new evidence was not adduced at the first trial
due to police or prosecutorial error; and whether the second trial
is being pursued by the government with due diligence and expe-
dition. 9 Upon making its determination, the Court of Appeal
must issue an order either granting or denying the application to
quash the conviction.99 Providing a final procedural safeguard,
the acquitted defendant or prosecutor may immediately appeal
the court's decision to the House of Lords. 100
C. Britain's First Double Jeopardy Conviction: William Dunlop
Case
William Dunlop was one of the motivating factors in the pas-
sage of the Act. 1"1 In 1989, Dunlop was charged with the murder
of pizza delivery woman Julie Hogg.102 After two juries failed to
return verdicts in subsequent trials, the trial court judge ordered
Dunlop's acquittal. 10 3 Several years later, while Dunlop was in
prison on unrelated assault charges, he confided in a prison
guard that he had murdered Julie Hogg." 4 Because double jeop-
ardy laws at the time prevented reopening the murder charges,
Dunlop was charged and convicted of perjury in 2000 for making
97. Id. § 79(1).
98. Id. § 79(2).
99. The Court of Appeal must issue an order; it does not have discretion to disregard
the application. HOME OFFICE, supra note 67, at 51.
100. Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 33(1B) (Eng. & Wales).
101. See HOME AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE, supra note 69, 3 ("In a recent case a
man twice tried and cleared in 1991 of killing a pizza delivery woman in 1989 was eventu-
ally jailed for perjury after he admitted that he had lied in court when he denied mur-
der."); see also Mother's Justice Plea to Lords, BBC NEWS, July 9, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/uknews/englandltees/3051909.stm (reporting that the mother of the woman mur-
dered by Dunlop met with members of House of Lords during consideration of the Crimi-
nal Justice Act of 2003).
102. See Mother's Hope over Law Change, BBC NEWS, Nov. 25, 2003, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/england/tees/3235726.stm.
103. See id.
104. Murder Conviction Is Legal First, BBC NEWS, Sept. 11, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/uk news/england/tees/5150346.stm.
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false statements at his 1989 murder trial. 105 He was given a six-
year sentence. 106
The new double jeopardy provisions of the Act took effect in
April of 2005.107 Soon thereafter, Crown Prosecutor Martin Gold-
man, citing Dunlop's jailhouse confession as new and compelling
evidence, obtained permission from DPP Ken Macdonald to pur-
sue the case.0 ' The Court of Appeal determined that the evidence
was new and compelling and that it was in the interest of justice
to quash Dunlop's acquittal. 109 On September 11, 2006, Dunlop
made history by becoming the first person to be convicted under
the new double jeopardy law when he plead guilty to Hogg's mur-
der."0 He was sentenced to life in prison.'
III. ROAD To REFORM: THE MEANING OF "LIFE OR LIMB"
The young American nation inherited the concept of double
jeopardy from English common law." 2 The First Congress, pre-
ceded by several colonial legislatures,"' undertook a task that,
until that point, had never been done in the English legal tradi-
tion when it chose to codify the principle of double jeopardy. 114
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Press Release, Crown Prosecution Service, William Dunlop Pleads Guilty in First





111. Double Jeopardy Man Is Given Life, BBC NEWS, Oct. 6, 2006, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/uknews/england/tees/5412264.stm.
112. See ALFREDO GARCIA, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 27
(2002).
113. A total of four states had statutory or constitutional double jeopardy provisions
prior to 1791. The Massachusetts Bay Colony enacted its Body of Liberties in 1641 which
included the provision that "[n]o man shall be twise [sic] sentenced by [clivill [sic] [j]ustice
for one and the same [cirime, offence, or [tirespasse [sic]." RUDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 11
(alterations in original). Connecticut enacted a similar provision with similar language in
1652. Id. at 11-12. In the decade preceding the drafting of the Fifth Amendment, both
New Hampshire and Pennsylvania enacted double jeopardy prohibitions. New Hamp-
shire's provision stated, "No subject shall be liable to be tried, after an acquittal, for the
same crime or offence." Pennsylvania's constitution contained the provision, "No person
shall, for the same offence, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Id. at 12. The Pennsyl-
vania double jeopardy standard is almost identical to the Fifth Amendment's language.
See id. at 12.
114. See SIGLER, supra note 20, at 4.
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James Madison first presented what would become the Fifth
Amendment.115 Madison's draft was less succinct than the final
version but unmistakable in its intent: "No person shall be sub-
ject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punish-
ment or one trial for the same offence."
116
Unfortunately, we know very little about why Madison's lan-
guage was rejected by the First Congress." 7 Representatives Eg-
bert Benson of New York and Roger Sherman of Connecticut were
recorded as having been opposed to Madison's wording."' They
feared that because the language restricted a person to one trial,
it might be construed as overinclusive and prevent a convicted de-
fendant from appealing his sentence.119 Benson's proposal to
eliminate "or trial" from the amendment was soundly defeated. 20
Madison's proposed language was approved as is by the House of
Representatives and sent to the Senate. 121 For reasons lost to his-
tory, the Senate changed the clause to read, "be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb by any public prosecution."'22 Although the
House opposed the Senate's changes, the conference committee
ultimately approved the present language of the Amendment,
dropping only "by any public prosecution" from the Senate's
draft. 123 The result, "nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,"124 was then
ratified. As a consequence, American courts have struggled with
interpreting the cryptic language of the Double Jeopardy Clause
for over two centuries.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that its double jeopardy
jurisprudence is "a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to
challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator."125 One conse-
quence of the Double Jeopardy Clause, however, is well settled:
acquittals in the United States are final.'26 Aside from one rare
115. RUDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 14.
116. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of James Madison).
117. See GARCIA, supra note 112, at 28.
118. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 30.
119. Id.
120. GARCIA, supra note 112, at 28.
121. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 31.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 31-32.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
125. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981).
126. See GARCIA, supra note 112, at 186-87 (noting that in the "paradigm" double jeop-
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exception, 127 acquittals may not be overturned or quashed under
any circumstances. 2 ' As the Court put it, "Perhaps the most fun-
damental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has
been that '[a] verdict of acquittal ... could not be reviewed, on er-
ror or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy,
and thereby violating the Constitution.
' 129
Although it may be the most settled aspect of double jeopardy
jurisprudence, the sanctity of acquittals is the primary obstacle to
meaningful double jeopardy reforms similar to those undertaken
in England's Criminal Justice Act of 2003. The time has come to
reevaluate the finality of acquittals. The ambiguities attending to
the passage of the Double Jeopardy Clause should caution
against over-reliance on even the most settled case law. A histori-
cal reevaluation of "life or limb," as it was understood by the
drafters of the Fifth Amendment, indicates that the double jeop-
ardy protection was intended to apply solely to capital cases-
cases in which the defendant's literal life or limb was in jeopardy.
Evidence from the common law usage of the "life or limb," up to
ardy case, the government may not reprosecute an acquitted defendant).
127. The exception applies when the criminal defendant was never actually placed in
jeopardy during the trial due to some extraordinary circumstance. See Aleman v. Judges of
the Circuit Court, 138 F.3d 302, 308 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the acquittal of a defen-
dant who bribed the trial judge did not bar reprosecution of the defendant because he was
"never in jeopardy at his first trial"); see also Gonzalez v. Justices of the Mun. Court, 382
F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2004) (allowing reprosecution of a defendant acquitted in a "sham trial"
in which no factual issues were argued), vacated 544 U.S. 918 (2005), affd on other
grounds, 420 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 2005). But see Goolsby v. Hutto, 691 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir.
1982) (holding that double jeopardy concerns prevent reprosecution even though no evi-
dence had been presented at trial).
128. There are, however, a few circumstances in which a convicted defendant may be
reprosecuted. In Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912), the Supreme Court deter-
mined that Gabriel Diaz's assault and battery conviction did not bar a subsequent homi-
cide trial when the victim later died from the injuries inflicted during the battery. Id. at
448-49 (interpreting a double jeopardy provision in Philippine law during the period in
which the Philippines were a United States Territory); see also People v. Latham, 631
N.E.2d 83, 85-86 (N.Y. 1994) (holding that attempted murder conviction did not bar sub-
sequent prosecution for second-degree murder after victim died). Under the "dual sover-
eignty doctrine" a defendant may be prosecuted by multiple states for committing a single
criminal act if the act "break[s] the laws of each." Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88
(1985); cf Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 434-35 (1847) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does
not bar a state from criminalizing an activity which is concurrently criminalized by Con-
gress). In Heath, hitmen hired by the defendant abducted Heath's pregnant wife from her
Alabama home and transported her to Georgia where they killed her. Heath, 474 U.S. at
83-84. The Court held that Heath's murder conviction in Georgia did not bar a subsequent
prosecution in Alabama for murder during a kidnapping for the killing. Id. at 93.
129. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) (quoting
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896)).
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and including Blackstone, suggests an interpretation of the
phrase that is applicable only to capital cases. American usage of
the phrase by the contemporaries of the drafters of the Fifth
Amendment further supports this contention. Viewing the Double
Jeopardy Clause in this context permits the pursuit of meaning-
ful double jeopardy reforms without offending its original intent.
Commentators have referred to the wording of the Double
Jeopardy Clause as "unclear" and "unfathomable."1 30 The term
"life or limb" is particularly confounding. 131 Another of the Fifth
Amendment's clauses, the Due Process Clause, states that a per-
son shall not be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." 132 The negative inference from such a word choice
in the same amendment as the Double Jeopardy Clause is that
the Double Jeopardy Clause was not intended to protect a per-
son's liberty or property rights. The Framers purposefully refer-
ence "life or limb" in the Double Jeopardy Clause in order to ex-
tend constitutional protection to situations where the
consequences of an erroneous conviction heavily outweighed the
utility of revisiting apparently faulty acquittals: capital cases in
which the defendant's life-not just liberty-is in jeopardy. 33
A. The Present (Lack of) Meaning of "Life or Limb"
The Court in Ex parte Lange 134 pronounced the rule that a de-
fendant may not be tried twice for any offense-felony or misde-
meanor, capital or otherwise-but it did so by employing lan-
guage paralleling Madison's original wording, which the First
Congress rejected. Glossing over the significance of the phrase,
"life or limb," the Court declared, "[W]e do not doubt that the
Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from
being twice punished for the same offence as from being twice tried
for it."'1 35 In support of this position, the Court cited a decision of
the New Jersey Supreme Court:
130. See GARCIA, supra note 112, at 28 (citing SIGLER, supra note 20, at 35).
131. See Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., The Case of Ex Parte Lange (or How the Double
Jeopardy Clause Lost Its "Life or Limb,") 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 69 (1999).
132. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
133. See Limbaugh, supra note 131, at 81; see also LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND
CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 197 (2006) ("'[Llife or limb' was a stan-
dard phrase in the eighteenth century for the death penalty.").
134. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
135. Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
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In the case of Cooper v. The State, in the Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey, the prisoner had been indicted, tried, and convicted for arson.
While still in custody under this proceeding he was arraigned on an
indictment for the murder of two persons who were in the house
when it was burned. To this he pleaded the former conviction in bar,
and the Supreme Court held it a good plea. It is to be observed that
the punishment for arson could not technically extend either to life
or limb; but the Supreme Court founded its argument on the provi-
sion of the constitution of New Jersey, which embodies the precise
language of the Federal Constitution. After referring to the common
law maxim the court says: "The constitution of New Jersey declares
this important principle in this form: 'Nor shall any person be sub-
ject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.'
Our courts of justice would have recognized and acted upon it as one
of the most valuable principles of the common law without any con-
stitutional provision. But the framers of our Constitution have
thought it worthy of especial notice. And all who are conversant with
courts of justice must be satisfied that this great principle forms one
of the strong bulwarks of liberty .... Upon this principle are founded
the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict."136
By conflating "jeopardy of life or limb" with the procedural effect
of the autrefois pleas, the Court stifled any further debate on the
meaning of the First Congress's curious word choice.
B. The Meaning of "Life or Limb" in Common Law
"Life or limb" was not a neologism created by the First Con-
gress. The phrase had a "literal meaning in English history"137 for
hundreds of years before it was incorporated into the Fifth
Amendment. The term "life or limb" refers to criminal punish-
ments involving the loss of natural life or limb throughout Eng-
lish legal history.138 Many ancient sources from the common law
include the phrase-always in reference to severe corporal pun-
ishment.'39 The learned men drafting the Double Jeopardy
Clause were undoubtedly familiar with many of these sources.14°
136. Id. at 171-72 (quoting State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361, 370-71 (1833)); see also
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96 (1978) ("[T]he three common-law pleas of autrefois
acquit, autrefois convict, and pardon .... lie at the core of the area protected by the Double
Jeopardy Clause.").
137. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 5.
138. Id.
139. This primarily means corporal punishment because the severing of limbs as a
punishment had fallen out of favor by the eighteenth century. See Limbaugh, supra note
131, at 65.
140. See id. at 79-82.
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Although the evidence may be largely circumstantial, we have no
better way to peer into the minds of the Framers who chose "life
or limb" than by reading and examining the sources that they
likely read and examined.'41
The Magna Carta contains the first known reference to the
term "life or limb" in the common law tradition. 142 At the time the
Magna Carta was issued in 1215, the criminal justice system in
England was not overly concerned with prosecuting crimes occur-
ring between subjects of the Crown. 143 When a party accused an-
other of committing a felony, judicial trial by combat often oc-
curred, which quite literally placed the accused's life and limbs in
jeopardy. 144 The Magna Carta signaled the demise of trial by bat-
tle by declaring, "Nothing in future shall be given or taken for a
writ of inquisition of life or limbs, but freely it shall be granted,
and never denied."'45 Thus, a party could plead the writ of life or
limb and be judged by twelve of his neighbors in substitution of
trial by battle.'46
The term "life or limb" appeared again four years later, in
1219, in a "temporary ordinance" of the King's Council.'47 In the
absence of trial by ordeal or combat, Henry III ordered England's
judges to imprison persons suspected of felonies."4 Judges were
correspondingly instructed that the prisoners' "vitae et mem-
brorum"-life or limb-was not to be jeopardized. 4 9 The reference
provides a clear early example of the differentiation between pun-
ishments affecting life or limb and those involving lesser punitive
measures, such as incarceration.
Dating from one generation after the creation of the Magna
Carta, a court document directs the judges in the Tower of Lon-
141. Cf supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of records from
the First Congress explaining the wording of the Double Jeopardy Clause).
142. GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW 120 (1998).
143. WILLIAM SHARP McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT
CHARTER OF KING JOHN 359-60 (2d ed. 1914).
144. Id. at 359. If the accuser lost the battle, then the result was considered just as he
was thereby proven to be a perjurer. Id. at 360.
145. Id. at 359 ("Nichil detur vel capiatur de cetero pro brevi inquisicionis de vita vel
membris, sed gratis concedatur et non negetur.").
146. Id. at 361-62.
147. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAw 79 (1896).
148. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 9.
149. THAYER, supra note 147, at 79.
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don to observe the provisions of the Dictum of Kenilworth.15 ° By
separating "life or limb" from imprisonment with the disjunctive,
"or," it further reinforces that in early common law a punishment
affecting "life or limb" was distinguishable from a punishment in-
volving incarceration:
[Ihf appeal or complaint of robbery and breach of the peace or homi-
cide should be made before justices in eyre or of other offences in the
time of the war against any who were against the late king or
against others, or if presentments of such offences should be made as
are wont [sic] to be made at the capitula of the crown, no one should
lose life or limb or incur the penalty of perpetual imprisonment on
these grounds, but that justice should be done in another manner
concerning damages or things lost or carried off and trespasses ac-
cording to the discretion of the late king's justices.... 151
Later English legal historians have discussed the meaning of
life or limb at common law. Two such historians, Lord Edward
Coke and Sir William Blackstone, are of particular importance
because, as one commentator put it, "To colonial lawyers, Coke
and Blackstone were names which had become synonymous with
the common law itself."" 2 Lord Coke, writing in 1681 on the his-
tory of English common law, affirms the common law distinction
between life or limb punishments-referring to capital punish-
ment-and lesser penalties. 153 Lord Coke explained that English
criminal statutes employed the phrase life or member154 to denote
capital punishment, which Coke distinguishes from penalties in-
volving loss of liberty or property:
[S]ome statutes . . .are not extended to the loss of life or member,
but to imprisonment, lands and goods. But if an act of parliament
saith, Eeit judgement de vie et member [judgment of life or limb] ....
in that case judgment of death shall be given, as in case of felony,
viz. [sic] that he be hanged by the neck till he be dead.... 1 5 5
150. THE DICTUM OF KENILWORTH IN THE COURTS (1276), reprinted in 3 ENGLISH
HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS, 1189-1327, at 580-81 (Henry Rothwell ed., 1996) (1975). The
Dictum of Kenilworth, which stated the terms for peace between King Henry III and rebel-
lious supporters of Simon de Montfort, can be found at THE DICTUM OF KENILWORTH
(1266), reprinted in 3 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS, 1189-1327, at 380-84, supra.
151. Id. at 580 (second emphasis added).
152. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 16.
153. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND
GOVERNMENT APPEALS OF ACQUITTALS (1987), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 831,
842 (1989) (noting that Coke equated "judgment of life or member [limb]" with felonies).
154. Coke's use of the term member is synonymous with limb. It is based on his trans-
lation of the Latin member to English. Blackstone also used the word member as a syno-
nym for limb. See infra text accompanying note 164.
155. J.H. THOMAS, 3 A SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF LORD COKE'S FIRST INSTITUTE OF
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Particular scrutiny should attend to Blackstone's treatment of
the term "life or limb" because scholars and courts have attrib-
uted the language of the Double Jeopardy Clause directly to
Blackstone.156 In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, writ-
ten a decade before the American Revolution, Blackstone engages
in a lengthy discussion of life and limbs.157
Blackstone gives the word "life" literal and civil meanings. It is
expressed in its literal meaning as "natural life being ... the im-
mediate donation of the great [c]reator."158 In addition to natural
life, the common law contemplated a "civil life" consisting of all
the rights and responsibilities of lawfully living in society.159 Life
could be lost through natural death, be forfeited by choice, or be
taken by the state.16 ° A man could choose to become civilly dead
by becoming a monk, at which time his worldly possessions and
rights passed to his heirs as if he were naturally dead.161 Civil
death could also occur by operation of law if the person was "ban-
ished or abjured the realm."162 Natural life could be taken by gov-
ernment authority when it is "forfeited for the breach of those
laws of society, which are enforced by the sanction of capital pun-
ishments."163
Limbs are given only a literal description by Blackstone:
"[Tihose members which may be useful to [a person] in fight, and
the loss of which alone amounts to mayhem by the common
law."164 According to Blackstone, no individual has the authority
to deprive a person of life or limb, and "the common law [of Eng-
land] does never inflict any punishment extending to life or limb,
unless upon the highest necessity."1 5
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 448-49 (1836).
156. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969); THOMAS, supra note 142,
at 7.
157. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *129-34.
158. Id. at *133.
159. Id. at *132.
160. See id. at *132-33.
161. Id. at *132.
162. Id.
163. Id. at *133.
164. Id. at *130. The offense of mayhem was committed by causing a severe injury to
the victim that deprived the victim of the use of any of her arms or legs. 3 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 157, at *121.
165. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 157, at *133 (emphasis added).
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A passage from Blackstone's Commentaries is often errone-
ously cited in support of the proposition that the wording of the
Double Jeopardy Clause is intended to extend its scope to all ac-
quittals-capital or otherwise:166
[T]he plea of autrefois acquit, or a former acquittal, is grounded on
this universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is
to be brought into jeopardy of his life, more than once, for the same
offence [sic]. And hence it is allowed as a consequence, that when a
man is once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other
prosecution, before any court having competent jurisdiction of the of-
fence, he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusa-
tion for the same crime. 1
67
According to the generally-accepted argument, Blackstone's
phrase "jeopardy of life" is a term of art referring to any punish-
ment. 168 The incorporation of the term "life or limb" into the Fifth
Amendment is therefore nothing more than Blackstone's term for
the possibility of punishment-jeopardy of life-with the addition
of "or limb"' for alliterative flourish.169 The reliance on the above
quoted passage for this purpose, however, is misplaced. It disre-
gards the fact that Blackstone frames the "universal maxim" in
terms of "jeopardy of his life." Far from being a simple term of art,
Blackstone ascribed a very particular meaning to the word life; 170
life means natural or civil life. In particular, it is natural life that
Blackstone states is imperiled by the "breach of [the] laws of soci-
ety."'71 Life is not lost by incarceration. Jeopardizing life, as it is
defined by Blackstone, therefore must involve the threat of natu-
ral death or banishment.
Further, commentators who cite Blackstone's "jeopardy of life"
passage 72 as the model for the Double Jeopardy Clause fail to
give any significance to the Framers' decision to write "jeopardy
of life or limb" into the Fifth Amendment. Supposing that the
Framers had the writings of Blackstone in mind when they were
constructing the Double Jeopardy Clause, then presumably they
166. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969).
167. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 157, at *335.
168. See THOMAS, supra note 142, at 121-22.
169. See id.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 158-63.
171. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 157, at *133.
172. See supra text accompanying note 167.
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were also cognizant of Blackstone's discussion of "life or limb."'73
A plausible rationale for the phrase "jeopardy of life or limb" in
the Fifth Amendment becomes apparent if the phrase is decon-
structed into two constitutive parts: "jeopardy of life" and "life or
limb"-each derived from separate passages in Blackstone's
Commentaries. By employing Blackstone's "jeopardy of life"
phrase, the Framers adopted Blackstone's reasoning that "the
plea of autrefois acquit.., is grounded on this universal maxim
... that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life, more
than once, for the same offense."174 However, the Framers quali-
fied this constitutionalization of the autrefois acquit plea by ap-
pending "life or limb," which restricted its application to cases in-
volving the death penalty.
C. "Life or Limb" in American Usage Prior to Ex parte Lange 7 5
An examination of the use of "life or limb" by contemporaries
and near-contemporaries of the First Congress should prove bene-
ficial to the task of ascertaining its intended meaning. In the lat-
ter part of the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth
centuries debate regarding the meaning of the phrase was gener-
ally confined to the courts, which struggled to reconcile the com-
mon law tradition of the autrefois pleas with the wording of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. When used in other contexts, such as in
writings and statutes, "life or limb" commonly appeared as a
synonym for capital punishment, which is consistent with its
English usage dating back to the Magna Carta.
1. "Life or Limb" in the Judiciary
In the decades following the passage of the Fifth Amendment,
there was no consensus in the courts on the meaning of "life or
limb." Jurisdictions did not agree whether the Double Jeopardy
Cause's drafters had intended life or limb to have its generally
understood meaning or whether they had made an inartful at-
tempt to constitutionalize the autrefois pleas. Based on their
173. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
174. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 157, at *335.
175. The Ex parte Lange decision in 1874 is a natural cutoff point for researching usage
of "life or limb" since the Court laid down the phrase's authoritative meaning in that case.
See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
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reading of the phrase, courts in the early nineteenth century
tended to espouse one of three interpretations of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.'76
One group of courts adopted the construction of the Double
Jeopardy Clause that would later be embraced in Ex parte Lange,
and which continues to be the prevailing view today.'77 Largely
disregarding the importance of the phrase "life or limb," these
courts maintained that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented
reprosecution of an acquitted defendant for any offense, including
misdemeanors. 7 In practical effect, this interpretation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause imported many common law double
jeopardy principles into the Fifth Amendment. 7 9
A second group of courts argued persuasively that the phrase,
"life or limb," limited the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause to
felonies.
The expression, jeopardy of limb, was used in reference to the nature
of the offence, and not to designate the punishment for an offence;
for no such punishment as loss of limb was inflicted by the laws of
any of the states, at the adoption of the constitution. Punishment by
deprivation of the limbs of the offender would be abhorrent to the
feelings and opinions of the enlightened age in which the constitu-
tion was adopted, and it had grown into disuse in England, for a long
period antecedently. We must understand the term, "jeopardy of
limb," as referring to offences which, in former ages, were punishable
by dismemberment, and as intending to comprise the crimes de-
nominated in the law, felonies. 180
176. Groupings represent the author's generalizations. To address all the nuances of
judicial interpretations of the Double Jeopardy Clause in the early nineteenth century
would be beyond the scope of this comment.
177. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 173 (2001) ("[Tlhe Fifth Amendment's Double
Jeopardy Clause... prevents multiple or successive prosecutions for the 'same offence.'").
178. See, e.g., Wyatt v. State, 1 Blackf. 257, 258 n.1 (Ind. 1823); Commonwealth v.
Olds, 15 Ky. (5 Litt.) 137, 137 (1824) (suggesting that double jeopardy protection would
have been available to a defendant charged with failing to register a billiard table if a final
judgment had been pronounced against him in his initial trial).
179. The common law doctrine was formerly said to be that a jury once sworn
and charged in any criminal case could not be discharged without giving a ver-
dict. And it was contended that this doctrine is recognized by the 5th Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution. It is now considered, however, that the common
law is that no one shall be twice tried for the same offense.
Wyatt, 1 Blackf. at 258 n.1 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
180. People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 187, 201 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820); see also Common-
wealth v. Purchase, 19 Mass. (1 Pick.) 521, 523 (1824) ("So in the amendment to the con-
stitution of the United States, which provides that no person shall 'be subject, for the same
offence, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;' all felonies, whether capital or other-
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By limiting the double jeopardy protection to felonies, these
courts ascribed meaning to "life or limb," rather than relegating
the phrase to surplusage. Their conclusion, however, was off the
mark. Properly understood in its historical context "life or limb"
referred to a mode of punishment rather than a degree of
crimes. "8
A third group of courts more faithfully applied the carefully
chosen wording of the Double Jeopardy Clause. These courts held
that the drafters of the Fifth Amendment intended "life or limb"
to have its commonly accepted meaning, so that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause was restricted to capital cases where life and limb
were literally in jeopardy-"2 Justice Joseph Story fell into this
latter category, although he appears to have held a contrary view
at one point.
Justice Story published Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States in 1833. 3 In the Commentaries, Story explains
the meaning of the phrase "to be twice put 'in jeopardy of life and
limb."'18 4 He attributes the principle to the common law and de-
fines it: "[A] party shall not be tried a second time for the same
offence, after he has once been convicted, or acquitted of the of-
fence charged .. ."' Story makes no reference to the degree of
the offense charged, with the inference being that he understood
the Double Jeopardy Clause as applying to both capital and non-
capital offenses. This language, however, is at odds with his rul-
ing just one year later in the case of United States v. Gibert.8 6 In
Gibert, Story grapples with the meaning of life or limb:
wise, being included in that provision.").
181. See supra Part III.A.
182. See United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287, 1294 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No.
15,204); State v. Graham, 1 Ark. 428, 434-35 (1839); see also Commonwealth v. Simpson,
165 A. 498, 500 (Pa. 1933) (refusing to abandon the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause
applied only to capital offenses in spite of the Supreme Court's ruling in Ex parte Lange,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873)).
183. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1833).
184. Id. at 659 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
185. Id.
186. See 25 F. Cas. 1287 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 15,204).
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When, in a constitutional sense, can a person be said to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb? If resort should be had to the grammatical
structure and meaning of the words, the natural interpretation
would certainly seem to be, that no person should be twice put upon
trial for any offence, for which he would be liable, upon conviction, to
be punished with the loss of life or limb;-for jeopardy means haz-
ard, danger, or peril; and when a party is put upon trial for an of-
fense punishable with the loss of life or limb, and he stands for his
deliverance upon the verdict of the jury, he is thereby put in jeop-
ardy, hazard, danger or peril of his life or limb. '
8 7
Story concludes that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits new
trials only in capital cases.
My judgment is, that the words in the constitution, "Nor shall any
person be subject, for the same offence, to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb," mean that no person shall be tried a second time for the
same offence, where a verdict has been already given by a jury. The
party tried is in a legal sense, as well as in common sense, in jeop-
ardy of his life, when a lawful jury have once had charge of his of-
fence as a capital offence upon a good indictment, and have delivered
themselves of the charge by a verdict. 1
8 8
In In re Spier,"8 9 the Supreme Court of North Carolina offered
a very plausible rationale to differentiate the common law double
jeopardy standard and the purpose of the Fifth Amendment. The
Spier court affirmed the principle that "a citizen shall not be
twice put in danger of his life upon the same charge for a capital
offense." 9 ° It then questioned why courts in other jurisdictions
had given the Double Jeopardy Clause no meaning independent
of the common law autrefois pleas.
[I]t would seem strange that a familiar maxim of the common law,
admitted for ages without denial or controversy, should require a
solemn constitutional sanction for the more effectual protection of
the citizens. The pleas of "heretofore convicted" [autrefois convict]
and "heretofore acquitted" [autrefois acquit] are interwoven with our
criminal law .... Could the amendment to the Constitution of the
United States mean no more than this, when it provided that "no
187. Id. at 1294. Perhaps Justice Story decided to follow his own advice from nearly
thirty years earlier: "The words [of the Constitution] are to be taken in their natural and
obvious sense, and not in a sense unreasonably restricted or enlarged." Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816).
188. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. at 1301-02 (emphasis added). Justice Story argued further that
the Double Jeopardy Clause applied to the appeal of a conviction, as well as an acquittal.
189. 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 331 (1828).
190. Id. at 332.
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person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb"? Did the constitutions of several of the States
mean no more when they adopted the same article? As the common
law of every State already protects the accused against a second trial
191
The Spier court concluded that the capital defendant's life was in
jeopardy as soon as the jury was impaneled, and the protection of
the Double Jeopardy Clause attached concurrently.192 By con-
trast, the right to plead autrefois acquit only arose once a final
judgment had been entered.193 Consequently, the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause prevented a jury, once impaneled, from being dis-
missed without cause. 194 Such a practice, if allowed, could be ma-
nipulated to "operate oppressively to the prisoner." '195
United States v. Shoemaker,196 a federal circuit court case de-
cided in 1840, echoed the reasoning of Spier by giving the Double
Jeopardy Clause a meaning separate from common law notions of
double jeopardy. In a per curiam opinion likely written by Su-
preme Court Justice John McLean, 97 the court explained that it
was not the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause to prevent
subsequent prosecutions in non-capital cases; the common law al-
ready served such a purpose: "The offence charged against the de-
fendant does not subject him, if convicted, to the loss of either life
or limb, and it is not, therefore, within this provision of the con-
stitution; but the rights of the defendant are equally guarded by
191. Id. at 337 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
192. Id. ("When the jury are impaneled [sic] upon the trial of a person charged with a
capital offense, and the indictment is not defective, his life is in peril or jeopardy, and con-
tinues so throughout the trial.").
193. Id. at 338.
194. Id. at 337.
195. Id. at 338.
196. 27 F. Cas. 1067 (C.C.D. Ill. 1840) (No. 16,279).
197. The federal circuit court system of the time was quite different from the one in
place today. See 5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 249-54 (1974). Supreme Court justices spent roughly half the year "riding circuit,"
which involved traveling to various areas of the United States to preside over appeals from
the federal district courts. Id. at 248. Only one justice was assigned to each of the nine cir-
cuits. Id. at 249. Justice McLean was riding the Seventh Circuit, which included Illinois,
in 1840. Id. at 249. So it is reasonable to assume that Justice McLean presided over the
Shoemaker case. Moreover, the author of the opinion states, "From the limited access to
books, which I have had at this place, I can find no case in point," Shoemaker, 27 F. Cas.
at 1069, which suggests that the author was Justice McLean visiting the area rather than
a local district judge. It is, however, possible that the opinion was penned by a district
judge, who would have handled cases himself if the Supreme Court Justice riding circuit
were unable to attend court. SWISHER, supra, at 248.
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established principles." 9 ' The "established principle[]" the opin-
ion referred to was the common law plea of autrefois acquit,
which was available to the defendant in Shoemaker to avoid a
vexatious second prosecution for theft of mail. 199
2. In the Words of the Framers
The Framers of the Constitution were aware of the significance
of the phrase "life or limb." This proposition is evidenced by writ-
ings which make clear that the Framers understood "life or limb"
as a synonym for capital punishment. Thomas Jefferson refer-
ences life or limb in a 1778 letter to George Wythe.2 °° In the let-
ter, Jefferson includes a draft of a bill he penned for the Virginia
General Assembly on the subject of setting punishments for
crimes that had been, up until that point, punishable by death.201
In the bill's preface, Jefferson states the principle that "no crime
shall be henceforth punished by deprivation of life or limb, except
those hereinafter ordained to be so punished."2" 2 Jefferson defines
life or limb as "the punishment of cutting off the hand of a person
... [or] death."2" 3
John Adams employs the phrase in similar fashion when writ-
ing about his misapprehensions of the power of Parliament. Ad-
ams makes a distinction between punishments involving life or
limb and those involving deprivation of liberty: "[I]f Parliament
can erect dioceses and appoint bishops, they may introduce the
whole hierarchy, establish tithes, forbid marriages and funerals,
establish religions, forbid dissenters, make schism heresy, impose
198. Shoemaker, 27 F. Cas. at 1068.
199. Id. at 1069 ("The plea of auterfois acquit consists of matter of record, and matter
of fact .... If a defendant be acquitted on the misdirection of the judge, still his acquittal
may be pleaded."). In the case, the prosecutor had entered a nolle prosequi, without cause,
before the jury returned a verdict. Id. The court held that the defendant's autrefois acquit
plea could not be "technically sustained" because the defendant had not actually been ac-
quitted. Id. However, because the prosecutor's actions "must be considered equivalent to a
verdict of acquittal," the court allowed the plea of former acquittal. Id. at 1069-70.
200. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe (Nov. 1, 1778), in 1 MEMOIR,
CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES: FROM THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 119, at
121 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829).
201. Id. at 120.
202. Id. at 121.
203. Id. at 121 n.*.
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penalties extending to life and limb as well as to liberty and prop-
erty."2 °4
3. Statutory Treatments of "Life or Limb"
Various state statutes in effect prior to Ex parte Lange incorpo-
rated life or limb as a synonym for capital punishment.0 5 In
South Carolina, for instance, the penalty for a slave harboring a
runaway slave was "corporal punishment, not extending to life or
limb .... ,,20' The distinction makes it clear that punishments in-
volving "life or limb" are distinguishable from corporal punish-
ment in general. A similar provision under Texas law for the pun-
ishment of slaves stated, "That [all crimes, below those denomi-
nated capital] known to the common law of England, committed
by slaves, shall be triable ... and on conviction shall be punished
at the discretion of said courts, so as not to extend to life or
limb."2 7 In Florida, the penalty for a slave committing a misde-
meanor, which by definition could not result in capital punish-
ment, was "punishment of which shall not affect life or limb."208
Under Massachusetts law, homicide was justifiable only if the ac-
tor's "life or limb"2 9 was threatened, which the act designates as
a "criminal aggression or attempt ... involving danger of mutila-
204. Letter from John Adams to Dr. J. Morse (Dec. 2, 1815), in 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 185 (1856).
205. "Life or limb" is not typically used to signify a manner of judicial punishment to-
day. However, many contemporary state constitutions and statutes continue to use the
phrase "life or limb" to denote grievous bodily harm or death in other contexts. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2 ("nor shall any child under sixteen years of age be employed
underground in mines, or in any occupation injurious to health or morals or hazardous to
life or limb"); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 25(a)(1) (limiting workdays to eight hours in profes-
sions "that the general assembly may consider injurious or dangerous to health, life or
limb"); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.360.1(4) (2004) (prohibiting from prisons "[a]ny gun, knife,
weapon, or other article ... [that may] endanger.., the life or limb of any offender or em-
ployee of such a center"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-616(c) (2004 & Supp. 2006) (allowing a
non-permitted driver to operate a motor vehicle "in situations of apparent extreme emer-
gency which require such operation to save life or limb").
206. B.C. PRESSLEY, THE LAW OF MAGISTRATES AND CONSTABLES, IN THE STATE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA 279 (1848).
207. HOWELL COBB, A SCRIPTURAL EXAMINATION OF THE INSTITUTION OF SLAVERY IN
THE UNITED STATES WITH ITS OBJECTS AND PURPOSES 139 (1856) (brackets in original).
208. GEORGE M. STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY 27 (2d ed.
1856).
209. REPORT OF THE PENAL CODE OF MASSACHUSETTS ch. 7, at 24 n.bb (1844).
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tion, loss of life, . . . destruction, maiming or disabling, or priva-
tion of the use or function of limb. ,210
D. Opening the Door to Reform by Restricting Double Jeopardy
Protection to Capital Offenses
The underlying principles served by the criminal justice system
as a whole, and by the Double Jeopardy Clause in particular, are
not entirely consistent. "[T]he central purpose of any system of
criminal justice is to convict the guilty and free the innocent."211
The Double Jeopardy Clause's function is consistent with this
purpose inasmuch as it prevents multiple trials of defendants,
which ostensibly decreases the likelihood that innocent persons
may be convicted.212 However, the other purpose of the criminal
justice system-that the guilty be convicted-may be frustrated
by a mechanical application of Ex parte Lange's version of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. A high price is paid when erroneous ac-
quittals are allowed to remain uncorrected.
Protecting the innocent from erroneous conviction is not the
sole purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause; it serves as a re-
straint on potentially abusive governmental power.213 As the
Court stated in Green v. United States,"4 the Double Jeopardy
Clause embodies the belief that,
the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged of-
fense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and inse-
curity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though inno-
cent he may be found guilty.
2 15
Put more succinctly, the "core purpose of the [Double Jeopardy]
Clause is to guard against a tyrannical state run amok."216
210. Id. at 24.
211. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 (1993); see also John F. Wirenius, A Model of
Discretion: New York's "Interests of Justice" Dismissal Statute, 58 ALB. L. REV. 175, 175
(1994) ("The purpose of the criminal justice system is ... to do justice in criminal cases.").
212. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-04 (1978).
213. See RUDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 39.
214. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
215. Id. at 187-88.
216. Gonzalez v. Justices of the Mun. Court, 382 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2004). The fear of
abusive use of the courts was very real to the Framers of the Fifth Amendment, who
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The competing objectives of the criminal justice system and the
Double Jeopardy Clause-respectively to furnish the state with
the tools to punish the guilty and to constrain prosecutorial
power-are not incapable of reconciliation. Properly restricting
the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection to cases in-
volving the threat of capital punishment-those cases in which
the defendant should enjoy the highest degree of procedural pro-
tections from the possibility of wrongful conviction-would allow
meaningful legislative reforms to double jeopardy along the Eng-
lish model.217
England's Criminal Justice Act of 2003 provides for multiple
layers of procedural and substantive safeguards to ensure that
the relaxed double jeopardy standards are not susceptible to
abuse. The procedures specified in the Act to quash acquittals
could be imported into the comparably structured American judi-
cial system without difficulty. Undoubtedly, American courts
would jealously administer the power to grant new trials, restrict-
ing it to instances when it was truly "in the interests of justice"21
to afford a prosecutor a second bite at the apple.
Measured and thoughtful reforms would not radically alter the
landscape of criminal procedure. The Double Jeopardy Clause
would not be eviscerated if its scope was limited to cases involv-
ing capital punishment. 219 For lesser offenses, the practical effect
of such a limitation would be negligible; presumably the common
law pleas of autrefois acquit would be resurrected by criminal de-
fense attorneys when the situation merited it. 22° This practice has
worked quite well in English criminal procedure for hundreds of
drafted the Double Jeopardy Clause largely in response to "horror at the wanton infliction
of capital punishment in England" at the time. Limbaugh, supra note 131, at 67.
217. See supra Part II.B-C.
218. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 79(1) (Eng. & Wales).
219. But see Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J.
1807, 1810-12 (1997) (arguing against a "hyperliteralist" interpretation of "life or limb").
220. See William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REV.
411, 414-15 n.17 (1993) (noting that the plea of autrefois acquit is still viable in most ju-
risdictions.). In the federal context, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a) could be swiftly amended to al-
low a former acquit plea. In the absence of an amendment to Rule 11, former acquit pleas
could be entered in federal trials in a similar fashion to Alford pleas. Federal prosecutors
are permitted to accept Alford pleas, which first arose in a state law context, see North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), in certain circumstances even though they are not
listed under FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(1). U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorney
Manual at 9-16.015, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareadingroom/usarn/title9/16
mcrm.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
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years. Distinct benefits would be obtained by state and federal
statutes patterned on the Criminal Justice Act of 2003, which
would limit the availability of such pleas in appropriate situa-
tions where new and compelling evidence called the prior acquit-
tal into doubt.
In the thirty-eight states that retain the death penalty,221 the
Double Jeopardy Clause would reassume the function the Fifth
Amendment's Framers intended by affording capital defendants
greater protections at trial. Capital defendants rightfully enjoy
procedural safeguards not available to defendants on trial for
lesser crimes because "[ifrom the point of view of the defendant,
[capital punishment] is different in both its severity and its final-
ity."222 The potential consequences of an erroneous capital convic-
tion are so high that they outweigh society's interest in the
"truth-seeking" function of criminal trials.2 23 As the Framers of
the Double Jeopardy Clause understood, when a defendant's life
and limb are in jeopardy, it's best to err on the side of caution.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment is
the greatest barrier to meaningful reform of American double
jeopardy law. By making acquittals sacrosanct the Court has
worked mischief upon the carefully chosen wording of the Fifth
Amendment and allowed unjust verdicts to go uncorrected-such
as the verdict which still permits admitted murderer Michael
Lane to evade justice.224 Based on the historical evidence relating
to the use of the term "life or limb," it is apparent that the phrase
had a singular meaning in English common law. The ancient us-
age of the phrase was adopted into the American lexicon as a ref-
erence for capital punishment.225 A proper understanding of the
First Congress's interpretation of the phrase "life or limb," which
was purposefully written into the Double Jeopardy Clause to re-
221. U.S. Department of Justice, Capital Punishment Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/cp.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
222. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977). See generally Margaret Jane Radin,
Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1143 (1980) (discussing heightened procedural protections for capital defendants).
223. See Limbaugh, supra note 131, at 81.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 3-9.
225. See supra Part III.A-B.
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strict the protection to capital cases, would allow meaningful re-
forms to take place. Acquittals that later turn out to be incorrect
could therefore be revisited without contravening the Fifth
Amendment.
A reasonable and just double jeopardy rule would have some
safeguards built in to allow patently unjust results to be rectified.
The English double jeopardy standard, described above,226 ap-
pears to strike the correct balance between protecting defendants'
rights and ensuring the accuracy of criminal verdicts. Thought-
fully crafted legislation, using England's Criminal Justice Act of
2003 as a guide, should therefore be pursued. Double Jeopardy
protection should be restricted to its proper scope by eliminating
the protection in non-capital cases under very narrow circum-
stances: when new and compelling evidence arises post-acquittal
that identifies the acquitted as the guilty party.
Justin W. Curtis
226. See supra Part II.B-C.
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